Biography, Page 4
(1, 2,
3, 4, 5)
The
shift in Guénon’s intellectual orientation away from occultism is
difficult to pinpoint precisely. However, as early as 1909 we find him
attacking what he saw as the misconceptions and confusions abroad in the
spiritualist movements.
Although his misgivings about many of the occultist groups were mounting
during the 1909–1912 period, it was not until the publication of two of
his earliest books that he launched a full-scale critique: Le Théosophisme, Historie d’une Pseudo-Religion (1921) and L’Erreur
Spirite (1923). The
titles are suggestive: they are lacerating attacks not only on theosophy
and spiritualism, but also on the Papus’ ‘gnostic’ groups, and
movements such as Rosicrucianism. Guénon’s exposé was not merely a
polemical fusillade, but a meticulously detailed analysis. Of the groups
in which Guénon himself had been involved only the Masons escaped
relatively unscathed. As Mircea Eliade has noted:
The most erudite and devastating critique of all these so-called
occult groups was presented not by a rationalist outside observer, but by
an author from the inner circle, duly initiated into some of their secret
orders and well acquainted with their occult doctrines; furthermore, that
critique was directed, not from a sceptical or positivistic perspective,
but from what he called ‘traditional esoterism’. This learned and
intransigent critic was René Guénon.
The
details of this demolition job need not concern us here, but it is worth
noting the main lines of attack. Guénon’s fundamental indictment was
that such movements, far from preserving traditional esoterisms, were made
up of a syncretic mish-mash of distorted and heterogeneous elements forced
into a false unity, devoid of any authentic metaphysical framework. Thus
they were vulnerable to the scientistic ideologies of the day and
inevitably fell prey to the intellectual confusions rampant in Europe. One
of the most characteristic confusions of such groups, to cite but one
example, was the mistaking of the psychic for the spiritual.
Occultism as a whole he now saw as one of the ‘signs of the times”, a
symptom of the spiritual malaise in modern civilization. Guénon was to take up some of these charges again in later
works, especially The Reign of
Quantity.
Guénon’s
interest in Eastern metaphysical traditions had been awakened around 1909,
and some of his early articles in La
Gnose were devoted to Vedantic metaphysics. His first book, Introduction Générale á l’Étude des Doctrines Hindoues (1921),
marked Guénon a commentator of rare authority. It also served notice of
Guénon’s formidable power as a critic of contemporary civilization. Of
this book Seyyed Hossein Nasr has written
It was like a sudden burst of lightening, an abrupt intrusion into
the modern world of a body of knowledge and a perspective utterly alien to
the prevalent climate and world view and completely opposed to all that
characterizes the modern mentality.
However,
Guénon’s axial work on Vedanta, L’Homme
et son Devenir selon le Védânta, was published in 1925. Other
significant works in the field of oriental traditions include La Métaphysique Orientale, delivered as a lecture at the Sorbonne
in 1925 but not published until 1939, La
Grande Triade, based on Taoist doctrine, and many articles on such
subjects as Hindu mythology, Taoism and Confucianism, and doctrines
concerning reincarnation. Interestingly, Guénon remained more or less
incognizant of the Buddhist tradition for many years, regarding it as no
more than a ‘heterodox development" within Hinduism, without
integrity as a formal religious tradition. It was only through the
influence of Marco Pallis, one of his translators, and Ananda
Coomaraswamy, that Guénon decisively revised his attitude.
During
the 1920s, when Guénon was moving in the coteries of French Catholicism,
he turned his attention to some aspects of Europe’s spiritual heritage.
As well as numerous articles on such subjects as the Druids, the Grail,
Christian symbolism, and folkloric motifs, Guénon produced several major
works in this field, including L’Ésotérisme
de Dante (1925), St Bernard
(1929), and Le Symbolisme de la
Croix (1931). Another
work, Autorité Spirituelle et Pouvoir Temporel (1929), was occasioned by
certain contemporary controversies. The quintessential Guénon is to be
found in two works that tied together some of his central themes: La Crise du Monde Moderne (1927), and his masterpiece, Le
Régne de la Quantité et les Signes des Temps (1945). The themes of
these two books had been rehearsed in an earlier one, Orient et Occident (1924). The books mounted an increasingly
elaborate and merciless attack on the foundations of the contemporary
European world-view. It will be useful to dwell on the last of these works
in some detail.
The Reign of Quantity
is a magisterial summation of Guénon’s work.
It is, characteristically, a difficult work. Guénon was quite
unconcerned with reaching a wide audience and addressed the book to those
few capable of understanding it, ‘without any concern for the inevitable
incomprehension of the others.’
He set out to challenge nearly all of the intellectual assumptions current
in Europe at the time. The book, he writes, is directed to
the understanding of some of the darkest enigmas of the modern
world, enigmas which the world itself denies because it is incapable of
perceiving them although it carries them within itself, and because this
denial is an indispensable condition for the maintenance of the special
mentality whereby it exists.
At
first sight the book ranges over a bewildering variety of subjects: the
nature of time, space, and matter, as conceived in traditional and modern
science; the philosophical foundations of such typically modern modes of
thought as rationalism, materialism, and empiricism; the significance of
ancient crafts, such as metallurgy; the nature of shamanism and sorcery;
the ‘illusion of statistics’; the ‘misdeeds of psychoanalysis’;
the ‘pseudo-initiatic’ pretensions of spiritualism, theosophy, and
other ‘counterfeit’ forms of spirituality; tradition and
anti-tradition; and the unfolding of cosmic and terrestrial cycles.
Close study of the book reveals that these apparently disparate
strands have been woven into a work of subtle design and dense texture. The
Reign of Quantity is a brilliantly sustained and excoriating attack on
modern civilisation. It has less polemical heat and moral indignation than
some of his earlier works, but is none the less effective for that.
The book is a controlled and dispassionate, but devastating, razing
of the assumptions and values of modern science. At the same time it is an
affirmation of the metaphysical and cosmological principles given
expression in traditional cultures and religions.
In
connection with the doctrine of cosmic cycles, Guénon unfolds a startling
thesis about the present terrestrial situation. His vision is rooted in
the Hindu conception of the Kali-Yuga,
but is not restricted to the purely Indian expression of this doctrine.
There is a dark apocalyptic strain in the book, which some readers
are tempted to dismiss as the rantings of yet another doom-sayer. For Guénon
the dire circumstances in which the modern world finds itself are to be
explained largely through an elucidation of the cosmic cycles, whereby
humankind is seen to be degenerating into an increasingly solidified and
materialized state, more and more impervious to spiritual influences.
Conversely, the world grows simultaneously more and more susceptible to
infernal forces of various kinds.
The forced spatial convergence of different civilizations correlates with
the temporal unfolding of the present terrestrial cycle, which is moving
toward an inexorable cataclysm.
Guénon
took the inevitable end of the world absolutely seriously.
By the time he wrote this book he believed ‘remedies’ were no longer
possible, that there was no escape from the apocalypse. To some readers
this looks like a ‘despairing pessimism’, to which Guénon might have
retorted that neither optimism nor pessimism have anything to do with the
matter. Moreover, what from one angle might be seen as a ‘worldly
pessimism’, appears from another as a ‘celestial optimism’, since
the end of a cycle marks its completion and the restoration of order.
Closely
related to the doctrine of cycles is Guénon’s profoundly challenging
thesis, based on traditional cosmologies, about nature of time, space, and
matter. Contrary to the claims of modern science, asserts Guénon, time
and space do not constitute a kind of uniform continuum or matrix in which
events and material phenomena manifest themselves. Rather, time-and-space
is a field of qualitative
determinations and differences. In other words, the nature of time and
space is not a constant, fixed datum, but is subject to both quantitative
and qualitative change. Any exclusively quantitative and materialistic
science such as now tyrannizes the European mind cannot accommodate this
principle: it strives rather to reduce qualitatively determined phenomena
to the barren and mechanistic formulae of a profane and materialistic
science. (One might add that some of the ‘discoveries’ of physicists
since Guénon’s time have done nothing to disprove his thesis; indeed,
to some minds they give it more credibility. Guénon himself would have
argued that metaphysical and cosmological principles such as he was
applying could in no way be affected by empirical considerations).
Guénon’s
critique of scientism—the ideology of modern science—is something
quite other than just another attack on scientific reductionism, although
that surely is part of his case. Nor is it a catalogue of the inadequacies
of this or that scientific theory. Rather, it is a radical and disturbing
challenge to almost every postulate of modern European science. The
critique hinges on the contrast between sacred, traditional sciences on
the one hand, and profane, materialistic science on the other. In an
earlier work Guénon had elaborated the basis of this contrast in
uncompromising terms:
Never until the present epoch had the study of the sensible world
been regarded as self-sufficient; never would the science of this
ephemeral and changing multiplicity have been judged truly worthy of the
name of knowledge… According to the ancient conception… a science was
less esteemed for itself than for the degree in which it expressed after
its own fashion… a reflection of the higher immutable truth of which
everything of any reality necessarily partakes…
[All] science appeared as an extension of the traditional doctrine
itself, as one of its applications, secondary and contingent no doubt…
but still a veritable knowledge none the less…
For
Guénon and the other traditionalists, the notion of a self-sufficient,
self-validating, autonomous material science is a contradiction, an
incongruity; for all sciences must have recourse to higher and immutable
principles and truths. Science must be pursued in a metaphysical and
cosmological framework that it cannot construct out of itself. In another
work Guénon wrote that modern science
in disavowing the principles [of traditional metaphysics and
cosmology] and in refusing to attach itself to them, robs itself both of
the highest guarantee and the surest direction it could have; there is no
longer anything valid in it except knowledge of details, and as soon as it
seeks to rise one degree higher, it becomes dubious and vacillating.
These
principles, of course, are quite alien to the modern mentality. They are
likely to provoke all kinds of quite irrelevant responses about the
material inadequacies of traditional cosmologies—geocentricism, for
example. The traditionalist vision of both traditional and modern science
cannot of course be so easily brushed aside, as even a cursory examination
of the relevant works will show; but space does not permit further
elaboration of this point here.
The Reign of Quantity
also seeks to demonstrate the intimate connections between traditional
metaphysics and the arts, crafts, and sciences that are found in any
traditional culture, and to show how modern and profane sciences are
frequently a kind of degenerated caricature of traditional sciences.Such
a demonstration turns largely on Guénon’s explanation of the nature of
symbolism and of the initiatic character of many traditional sciences.
What
of the qualities of mind and temperament revealed in Guénon’s writings?
Marco Pallis wrote of Guénon that he had
a mind of phenomenal lucidity of a kind one can best describe as
‘mathematical’ in its apparent detachment from anything savoring of
aesthetic or even moral considerations; his criteria of what was right and
what was inadmissible remained wholly intellectual ones needing no
considerations drawn from a different order of reality to reinforce
them—their own self-evidence sufficed.
Another
commentator speaks of Guénon’s exposition as ‘so crystalline and
geometric, so mathematically abstract and devoid of almost any human
element,’
while Gai Eaton notes that ‘in him the blade of French intellectuality
is tempered to a razor-sharp edge.’
Theodore Roszak writes of his ‘keen, spiritual discrimination,’
while Schuon, referring to the absence of any sentimental or even psychic
dimension in Guénon’s work, once used the image of ‘an eye without a
body.’
These
images of sharpness, or a finely-honed cutting edge—a mathematical
precision and incisive penetration—all testify to Guénon’s clarity of
thought in his metaphysical expositions and his pitiless exposure of the
‘signs of the times.’ Nonetheless, Guénon’s work is by no means
easy to assimilate. Gai Eaton, a great admirer of Guénon, concedes that
‘it is questionable whether anyone with the normal tastes and
intellectual background of our day can approach Guénon’s work for the
first time without a sense of revulsion.’
Why so?
Firstly,
there is the substance of Guénon’s work. It is not easy of access and,
at first sight, often strange, startling, baffling. His premises are too
radically at odds with conventional wisdom for him to gain any easy
following. His critique of European civilization is so ruthless, so
unnerving in its implications, that it often provokes a kind of defensive
reflex, an emotional and intellectual resistance that makes for a failure
to engage what is actually being said. Without the right kind of
predisposition, the reader is unlikely to recover from the initial shock.
An acceptance of Guénon’s general thesis also entails a drastic
intellectual and existential adjustment for most readers. Andre Gide
typified one kind of response to Guénon’s work when he wrote:
If only I had known Guénon in my youth!… Now it is too late; the
die is cast. My sclerosed mind has as much difficulty conforming to the
precepts of that ancestral wisdom as my body has to the so-called
‘comfortable’ position recommended by the Yogis… To tell the truth,
I cannot even manage really to desire resorption of the individual into
the Eternal Being they seek… I cling desperately to my limits and feel a
repugnance for the disappearance of those contours that my whole education
made a point of defining… I am and remain on the side of Descartes and
of Bacon. Nonetheless, those
books of Guénon are remarkable...
This
is very much to the point. Guénon’s vision cannot be accepted ‘a
little’. One might disagree
of course over details, but his fundamental premises must either be
accepted or rejected. There is nothing of the smörgasbord
in Guénon’s writings.
Then
also there is Guénon’s claim to being a mouthpiece for a metaphysical
vision or theoria that is beyond
the reach of ‘proof’, or even of debate. Take for instance, the
following:
Those who are qualified to speak in the name of a traditional
doctrine are not required to enter into discussion with the ‘profane’
or to engage in polemics: it is for them simply to expound the doctrine
such as it is, for the sake of those capable of understanding it, and at
the same time to denounce error wherever it arises... [Their] function is
not to engage in strife and in doing so to compromise the doctrine, but to
pronounce the judgement which they have the right to pronounce if they are
in effective possession of the principles which should inspire them
infallibly.
Such
a passage is likely to stick in the craw—to say the least—of many
contemporary scholars, for obvious enough reasons. For Guénon, a genuine
understanding of metaphysical principles represents a ‘permanent and
changeless certitude’ that leaves no room for debate: one either
understands these principles or one does not. Guénon was not bent on
‘proving’ anything whatsoever, but only on making traditional
doctrines more intelligible.
Hand
in hand with this perception of his role went a tone of implacable
certitude, all too easily seen as a kind of intellectual arrogance. Roszak,
for example, speaks of ‘a mind whose very precision led to an
aristocratic intolerance and an elitism that risked sterility.’
Roger Lipsey refers to Guénon’s ‘formidably intolerant’ attitude to the modern
West, while Pallis writes of his ‘habitually hectoring tone… adopted
in regard to people whose views he disapproved of.’
Bernard Kelly refers to the ‘withering, intransigent, unbending’ tone
of Guénon’s writings.
Jacques Lacarriere has regretted Guénon’s ‘aristocratism, his
exclusive attachment to esoterism, his arbitrary rejection—and at times
indeed, his faulty knowledge—of contemporary philosophies, and his
ferocious intellectualism.’
There
is in Guénon’s work an adamantine quality, an austerity and
inflexibility, and a combative tone, as well as ‘icy brilliance.’
He was not one to coax, cajole, or seduce his readers. He wrote as a man
convinced that he was in possession of timeless truths, and would brook no
compromises. There is no concession to alternative points of view, no
sense of dialogue with his readers, no hospitality to any ideas at odds
with those he is expressing. Something of Guénon’s unyielding posture
is evinced in the following passage (and it needs be remembered that he is
writing in the 1920s):
hitherto, so far as we are aware, no one else beside ourselves has
consistently expounded authentic Oriental ideas in the West; and we have
done so...without the slightest wish to propagandize or to popularize, and
exclusively for the benefit of those who are able to understand the
doctrines just as they stand, and not after they have been denatured on
the plea of making them more readily acceptable…
In
an unusually personal vein, Guénon reprimanded a critic who had suggested
that he had ‘passed’ from Hinduism to Islam:
We have never ‘passed’ from one thing to another, as all our
writings abundantly prove; and we have no need to ‘seek the truth’
since we know (and we must insist upon this word) that it exists equally
in all traditions…
For
many contemporaries such claims will doubtless smack of arrogance and
extravagant confidence. However, the crucial point is this: to be offended
by Guénon’s ‘arrogance’, and to invalidate his message, are two
quite different matters. It is to the latter purpose that Guénon’s
would-be critics should address themselves. One might also add that in
these times of full-scale relativism any claim to certitude is likely to
be dismissed, without further consideration, as ‘arrogance’, or
‘fanaticism’, or some such thing. Looked at from another angle, Guénon’s
militant posture is nothing other than an expression of his fierce
commitment to the truth, and it is precisely his refusal to compromise
first principles that gives his work its power and integrity.
(1,
2, 3,
4, 5)